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Introduction 
 Literature pertaining to the “liability of newness” contends that newer firms face 
particular difficulties and a greater risk of failure.  This article seeks to determine if “newness” is 
also a disadvantage in the acquisition of debt capital.  Results indicate that newer firms were 
significantly less likely to have lines of credit and were also significantly more likely to have 
been turned down for their most recent loan.  Even when we control for length of relationship 
with the primary financial services provider, personal guarantees, and collateral, younger firms 
were still more likely to be turned down for loans. 
 Small firms are an essential part of the United States economy.  According to the U.S. 
Small Business Administration (SBA), there were 22.9 million small firms, defined as firms 
having 500 or fewer employees, in the United States in 2002 (Small Business by the Numbers, 
2002).    In fact, small firms represent 99 percent of all firms in this country.  They provide 
approximately half of Gross Domestic Product as well as the majority of new jobs.  Small firms 
are also an important source of innovation in the development of new products, services, and 
technologies. 
 Given the role played by small firms, it is in our interest to identify factors that contribute 
to their likely success.   In keeping with that, studies of small firm survival and failure have 
repeatedly identified difficulties with financial management and an inability to secure adequate 
sources of capital as major contributors to dissolution (Gaskill et al., 1993), Lussier, 1996; 
Watson et al., 1998).   
 Many small firms are launched with inadequate financial resources.  To compound this 
problem, small firms, unlike larger, publicly-held firms, are unable to raise capital in the public 
debt and equity markets (Ang, 1991).  Alternatively, they are restricted to sources of capital that 
include the owner’s savings, loans from family and friends, trade credit, and loans from banks 
and other financial service providers (Berger & Udell, 1998; Bitler et al., 2001).  Even in the 
case of bank loans, however, small firms are more likely to be denied than larger, more 
established firms. As noted above, the inability to secure external sources of capital raises the 
risk of firm failure.  On a slightly less dire note, inadequate capital may also restrict the firm’s 
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ability to grow, to hire employees, or to introduce new products and services thus impairing 
profitability and growth in the long term. 
 
I. The “liability of newness” 
Prior research has noted that young or “new” firms face particular difficulties and greater 
risk of failure.  The term “liability of newness” was first introduced by Stinchcombe in 1965.  
According to Stinchcombe, new organizations are more likely to fail for because: 
 
1) new organizations involve new roles that have to be learned; 
2) new organizations do not yet have standard routines to solve problems; 
3) new organizations rely on social relations with strangers; they do not have 
relationships of trust;  
4) new organizations do not have stable ties with those who use their services. 
 
 A number of studies on firm failure have confirmed the principle of a liability of 
newness.  Carroll (1983) conducted an exhaustive study using 52 different data sets to find that 
organizational death rates decline with firm age.  Phillips and Kirchoff (1989) found that three 
out of five new firms fail within their first six years.  In a study of over 5,000 Australian 
businesses, Watson and Everett (1996) found that a higher percentage of failed firms were 
younger businesses.  Using data on U.S. firms, Nucci (1999) also found that business dissolution 
declined with age regardless of industry, size grouping, or region. 
 Freeman et al. (1983) noted that new organizations are more likely to fail because they 
depend upon the cooperation of strangers and have low levels of legitimacy.  As time passes, 
organizational structures stabilize as do ties with external sources of support.  Hannan and 
Freeman (1984) observed that new organizations have weak claims to sources of support.   Thus 
they are highly vulnerable to environmental shocks (Hannan & Freeman, 1989) In contrast, older 
organizations have developed “dense webs of exchange”. 
 Although the “liability of newness” theory has been around for some time now, to date no 
one has really examined its relationship to access to capital.  Prior research on the liability of 
newness has centered primarily on its impact on organizational survival.  In fact, however, the 
liability of newness has a lot in common with the problem in finance known as “asymmetric 
information”.  According to the liability of newness, new organizations lack “relationships of 
trust” with individuals and organizations.  Similarly, asymmetric information refers to the 
incomplete flows of information between potential borrowers and lenders (Ang, 1992; Berger & 
Udell, 1998).  This is a particularly pressing problem for small firms that do not have readily 
available audited financial statements.  When faced with incomplete information, the typical 
response of lenders is to deny credit or to make it available only at higher rates of interest (Pettit 
& Singer, 1985; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; Weinberg, 1994). 
 This article will use data from the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) to 
test the liability of newness theory within the context of access to debt capital for small, privately 
held firms located in the United States.  It will seek to determine if newer firms do, in fact, 
experience greater difficulty in securing sources of debt capital.  Further, it will examine whether 
or not banking relationships, personal guarantees, or collateral can partially overcome the 
liability of newness.  
 
II. Description of the Data 
 Data for this study are drawn from the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) 
conducted every five years by the Federal Reserve.  The 1998 Survey is the most recent for 
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which data are publicly available and includes balance sheet and income statement data on 3,561 
small firms (500 or fewer employees) in the United States.  The Survey also includes information 
on financial products used by the firms as well as their financial service providers.  The SSBF is 
the largest and most comprehensive data set of its type representing a national sample of firms 
stratified by geographic region, industry sector, gender, and race.  Minority-owned firms are 
deliberately over-sampled to ensure adequate representation.  In light of that, sample weights are 
provided to correct for over-sampling and to allow for population estimates.  Those weights have 
been used in this analysis. 
 For purposes of this article, the SSBF has been divided into two groups of firms.  “New” 
firms are defined as firms that are five years old or younger.  “Mature” firms are firms older than 
five years.  Table 1 and 2 provide summary statistics for these two groups of firms.  Table 1 
reveals that new firms were significantly smaller than mature firms in terms of total assets, total 
sales, and total number of employees.  The mean level of assets for new firms was $248,735 
compared to $479,069 for mature firms.  Similarly, mean sales for new firms were $551,806 
compared to $1,153,372 for mature firms.  New firms had an average of 5.72 employees versus 
9.69 employees for mature firms.  These size distinctions are important, because lenders may 
view size as a measure of stability.  Thus, they may be more willing to lend to larger firms.  The 
year to year growth rate in sales for new firms was significantly higher than that of mature firms 
as one might expect (121.92% vs. 32.72%). 
 Table 1 also indicates that the owners of new firms were significantly younger than the 
owners of mature firms and had fewer years of experience.  The average age for the owners of 
new firms was 44.96 years compared to 52.13 years for the owners of mature firms.  New firm 
owners had an average of 10.72 years of experience versus 21.09 years of experience for the 
owners of mature firms.  Experience is a measure of human capital which may contribute to a 
greater likelihood of firm survival and success.  Given that, lenders may view owners with 
greater amounts of experience more favorably. 
 Table 2 reveals that 42.86 percent of new firms and 45.8 percent of mature firms were 
organized as corporations and limited liability entities.  The educational levels of the two groups 
of firm owners were similar; over 50 percent of both had attended college.  In terms of industry 
classifications, younger firms were significantly more likely to be in the transportation or retail 
industries, while mature firms were more likely to be in the fields of insurance, real estate, or 
construction and mining.   
 In terms of creditworthiness, a significantly higher percentage of new firms were rated as 
having “significant” or “high” risk by Dun & Bradstreet (38.10% vs. 25.37%).  In spite of that, 
however, new firm owners were no more likely to have had judgments against them, personal 
delinquencies, or bankruptcies than mature firms.  New firms were actually significantly less 
likely to have had a business delinquency than mature firms (11.00% vs. 14.42%), possibly 
because their businesses are so new. 
Table 2 also provides data on small firms’ use of alternative sources of short term credit, 
credit cards and trade credit.  It reveals that a high percentage of both new and mature firms used 
credit cards as a source of credit for their businesses (66.84% and 68.51%).  Similarly, a high 
percentage of both new and mature firms used trade credit (54.81% and 64.64%).  New firms 
were significantly less likely to use trade credit, however, and they were significantly more likely 
to have been turned down for trade credit (7.18% vs. 4.67%).  Like lenders, suppliers are in a 
position to gather “insider information” on the creditworthiness of small firms.  Their 
unwillingness to extend trade credit may signal their concern regarding the firm’s ability to pay 
(Coleman, 2003). 
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 Table 3 provides data on the borrowing experience of new and mature firms.  The SSBF 
tracks use of six different loan types; lines of credit, financial leases, commercial mortgages, 
equipment loans, vehicle loans, and other types of loans.  Table 3 indicates that new firms were 
significantly less likely to have one of these types of loans than mature firms.  Although 56.88 
percent of mature firms had some type of loan (Haveloan), only 50.35 percent of new firms had a 
loan.  One of the six types of loans tracked by the SSBF is a line of credit (LOC).  Lines of credit 
are very flexible types of loans in that they are typically unsecured and can be used for a variety 
of business purposes.  Table 3 indicates that new firms were significantly less likely to have lines 
of credit than mature firms (19.83% vs. 30.79%).  In terms of recent loan experience, new firms 
were also at a disadvantage.  Although a significantly higher percentage of new firms had 
applied for a loan within the previous three years (25.74% vs. 22.39%), a significantly lower 
percentage of new firms were approved for those loans (63.84% vs. 74.79%).  Further, a 
significantly higher percentage of new firms didn’t even bother applying, because they assumed 
they would be turned down (30.73% vs. 20.42%). 
 
III. Multivariate Analysis 
 The univariate results presented in Table 3 suggest that new firms experience greater 
difficulties in securing debt capital than mature firms.  The shortcoming of univariate analysis, 
however, is that it examines the effect of only one variable, i.e. “newness”, on the dependent 
variable.  Multivariate analysis corrects for this shortcoming by examining the simultaneous 
effect of several independent variables, including firm age, on a dependent variable.  To further 
test the relationship between firm age and use of debt capital, a multivariate model was 
constructed using Haveloan as the dependent variable.  In this instance, a logistic regression 
model was used since the dependent variable was dichotomous rather than continuous (Aldrich 
& Nelson, 1984; Cramer, 1991; Demaris, 1992).  The model took the following form: 
 
Model 1: 
Haveloan=a + b1New + b2Logsales +b3Growth +b4ROE + b5Org + b6Judge + b7Delinqp  
+ b8Delinqb + b9Bankrupt +b10CredCard + b11TradeCred + b12DenyTrade + e 
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 As noted above, Haveloan is a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the firm 
had one of the six types of loans tracked by the SSBF.  The independent variables represent firm 
characteristics that might be expected to affect the firm’s use of debt capital.  Both dependent 
and independent variables are defined in Appendix A.   
 New is a dichotomous variable separating the sample into firms that are five years old or 
younger from those that are more than five years old.  Prior research suggests that younger firms 
have a greater demand for external debt capital, but also that they are less likely to be able to 
secure it (Berger & Udell, 1998; Coleman & Cohn, 2000).  Logsales is a measure of firm size.  
Past studies reveal that smaller firms are less likely to use external sources of debt, possibly 
because their financing requirements are relatively modest (Bitler et al., 2001; Cole & Wolken, 
1995; Scherr et al., 1993).  The logged form of the sales variable was used since Table 1 suggests 
that sales are highly skewed.  Growth represents the year to year growth in sales.  It stands to 
reason that rapidly growing firms would be in greater need of external capital.  Similarly, those 
firms might be more attractive to lenders because of their growth potential.   
 Firm profitability is indicated by the continuous variable ROE or return of equity.  One 
would anticipate that more profitable firms would be more attractive to lenders (Binks & Ennew, 
1996).   Simultaneously, however, profitable firms may be more likely to self finance with 
retained earnings as opposed to using external debt (Berger & Udell, 1998).  Org is a 
dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the firm was organized as a corporation or some 
other type of limited liability entity.  Firms that have limited liability protection may be willing 
to use more debt (Brigham, 1992; Osteryoung, Newman, & Davies, 1997).   
 Judge, Delinqp, Delinqb, and Bankrupt are all dichotomous variables indicating whether 
the firm or the firm owner has some history of credit difficulties.  The variable Judge identifies 
those firm owners who have had judgments rendered against them within the previous three 
years.  Delinqp and Delinqb identify firm owners or firms that have had personal or business 
delinquencies.  Finally, Bankrupt identifies firm owners or firms that have experienced either 
personal or business bankruptcies within the previous seven years. Firms with a history of credit 
difficulties are obviously users of external debt.  They may, however, be less attractive to lenders 
given their poor track record for payment (Coleman, 2002). 
 CredCard is a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the firm used credit cards 
for business purposes.  Similarly TradeCred indicates whether or not the firms used trade credit.  
Both credit cards and trade credit are important sources of financing for small firms (Bitler et al., 
2001).  It may be that firms substitute credit cards and trade credit for other forms of borrowing 
(Danielson & Scott, 2000; Petersen & Rajan, 1997).  Alternatively, firms that use credit cards 
and trade credit may be more likely to borrow from other sources as well.  The variable 
DenyTrade indicates whether or not the firm has been turned down for trade credit.  As noted 
above, suppliers are in a position to gather “insider information” on customer firms.  Thus, their 
unwillingness to extend credit may provide an important signal to potential lenders (Coleman, 
2003). 
 The results of Model 1 are presented in Table 4 which reveals that larger firms and firms 
with a history of personal or business delinquencies were significantly more likely to have some 
type of loan.  Larger firms may have a greater demand for external credit, and they may be more 
attractive to lenders.  It also makes sense that firms with a history of credit difficulties are more 
likely to be users of external debt.  Alternatively, however, firms with a history of bankruptcy 
were significantly less likely to have a loan.  This suggests that lenders may view bankruptcies as 
a much more serious problem than delinquencies. Table 4 also reveals that firms that used credit 
cards or trade credit were significantly more likely to have some type of loan.  This suggests that 
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external loans supplement rather than substitute for other types of short term debt.  Thus, firm 
owners who are borrowers, use short term debt from a variety of sources.  Finally, Table 4 
indicates that there were no differences between firms classified as “new” and those classified as 
“mature” in terms of their overall use of loans. 
 A second model was developed using lines of credit (LOC) as the dependent variable 
together with the same independent variables used in Model 1.  Since lines of credit are typically 
unsecured, they may not be as readily accessible to newer firms.  The model took the following 
form: 
 
Model 2: 
LOC=a + b1New + b2Logsales +b3Growth +b4ROE + b5Org + b6Judge + b7Delinqp  
+ b8Delinqb + b9Bankrupt +b10CredCard + b11TradeCred + b12DenyTrade + e 
 
 Results of this model are also provided in Table 4.  In this model, firm age did have an 
impact.  Table 4 indicates that new firms were significantly less likely to have lines of credit.  
Thus, in instances where specific collateral is not associated with a loan, newer firms appear to 
be at a disadvantage. As in the case of Model 1, larger firms were significantly more likely to 
have lines of credit than smaller firms.  Less profitable firms were also significantly more likely 
to have lines of credit, possibly because they are not in a position to self finance with retained 
earnings.  In terms of credit quality, firms that had a history of personal delinquency or 
bankruptcy were less likely to have lines of credit.  These firms may be less attractive to lenders 
due to a greater perceived risk to repayment.  Interestingly enough, firms with a history of 
business delinquencies were significantly more likely to have a line of credit.   As noted above, 
firms that are borrowers are more likely to have delinquencies.  Further, lenders may not be as 
concerned about delinquencies as they are about bankruptcies.  As in the previous model, firms 
that used credit cards and trade credit as sources of financing were significantly more likely to 
have lines of credit. 
 The SSBF also includes information on each firm’s borrowing experience with its most 
recent loan defined as loans applied for and received in the past three years. Additional logistic 
regression models were developed to determine if firm age had an impact on the likelihood of 
applying for or receiving a loan within the previous three years.  These models took the 
following form: 
 
Models 3, 4, and 5: 
 
Mrlapp (or Mrlget or Noapply)=a + b1New + b2Logsales +b3Growth +b4ROE + b5Org +  
b6Judge + b7Delinqp + b8Delinqb + b9Bankrupt +b10CredCard + b11TradeCred +  
b12DenyTrade + e 
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 Mrlapp is a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the firm applied for a loan 
within the previous three years.  Mrlget indicates whether or not firms that applied for loans were 
granted them.  Finally, Noapply identifies firms that chose not to apply because they assumed 
they would be turned down.  The results of these additional models are provided in Table 5. 
 Table 5 reveals that new firms were significantly more likely to have applied for a loan 
within the previous three years (Mrlapp), but they were also significantly more likely to be 
turned down for a loan (Mrlget).  Further, new firms were significantly less likely to apply 
because they assumed they would be turned down (Noapply).  Thus, as in the case of lines of 
credit, it appears that new firms were at a relative disadvantage in terms of recent loan 
applications. 
 As in the previous models, larger firms (Logsales) were significantly more likely to apply 
for loans.  Alternatively, smaller firms were significantly more likely to say that they did not 
apply because they assumed they would be turned down.  Table 5 reveals that firms organized as 
corporations (Org) and more profitable firms (ROE) were more likely to be approved for loans.  
As anticipated, firms with a history of credit difficulties were significantly more likely to have 
applied for loans and were significantly more likely to be turned down.  Firms with a history of 
credit difficulties also indicated that they were significantly less likely to apply because they 
assumed they would be turned down. 
 Finally, firms that used credit cards for business purposes (CredCard) were significantly 
more likely to have applied for a loan, again suggesting that external loans supplement rather 
than substitute for other types of debt.  Firms that had been denied trade credit (DenyTrade) were 
also more likely to have applied for a loan, but they were more likely to have been turned down.  
Similarly, firms that had been denied trade credit were significantly more likely to say that they 
did not apply because they assumed they would be turned down.  This finding suggests that 
suppliers, like lenders, gather “insider information” on customer firms and that they use this 
information to make lending decisions.  Thus, a firm that is denied trade credit is also likely to be 
turned down for a loan. 
 
IV. Further Analysis 
 As noted above, asymmetric information refers to incomplete flows of information 
between a potential borrower and lender which may result in denial of credit.  As in the case of 
the “liability of newness”, asymmetric information is characterized by the lack of “relationships 
of trust”.  This is a particularly serious problem for younger firms. Several studies have been 
devoted to examining ways in which banks and borrowers can overcome the problem of 
incomplete information.    One way for them to do so is to develop longer term relationships with 
lenders.  This enables the lender to gather information concerning the firm over time and thus to 
establish a relationship of trust. Using data from the 1987 National Survey of Small Business 
Finances, Petersen and Rajan (1994) found that firms with longer banking relationships 
experienced greater availability of credit. Similarly, in a study of small firms, Ennew and Binks 
(1995) found that good banking relationships improved the quality and quantity of information 
flows.  This, in turn, led to higher levels of trust and confidence.  
 A second way to overcome informational asymmetries and lack of trust is by pledging 
collateral and personal guarantees.  A lender may feel a higher level of trust if the borrower 
stands to lose something in the event of non-payment.    In a study of small firms, Leeth and 
Scott (1989) found that loans to newer businesses showed a higher probability of being secured 
than loans to older firms. Using data from several of the National Surveys of Small Business 
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Finances, Avery et al. (1998) also found that firm age was the main factor in explaining 
variations of collateral with younger firms being more likely to have secured loans. 
 Table 6 reveals that a very high percentage of small firms, both new and mature, 
provided personal guarantees or collateral for lines of credit or for their most recent loan.  For 
lines of credit, 58.44 percent of new firms provided personal guarantees while 40.41 percent 
provided collateral.  In comparison, 61.12 percent of mature firms provided personal guarantees 
and 45.04 percent provided collateral.  A similar picture emerges for the most recent loan; 49.38 
percent of new firms and 55.01 percent of mature firms provided personal guarantees while 
53.94 percent of new firms and 58.69 percent of mature firms provided collateral.  There were no 
significant differences between new firms and mature firms in the use of personal guarantees or 
collateral for either lines of credit or their most recent loan.  Although lines of credit are typically 
unsecured, these results suggest that lenders feel that smaller firms are more risky in general.  
Thus, they may require guarantees or collateral from a high percentage of their small business 
customers.  Alternatively, small firms that are equipped to do so may offer guarantees or 
collateral as a way to secure lower interest rates on loans. 
 Not surprisingly Table 6 also indicates that mature firms had significantly longer 
relationships on average with their primary financial service provider.  Mature firms had average 
relationships of 114.63 months (approximately 10 years), while new firms had average 
relationships of 48.48 months (4 years).  Since new firms are, by definition, five years old or 
younger, it stands to reason that they would have shorter relationships. 
 As a further step in this analysis, an attempt was made to determine the effect of banking 
relationships, personal guarantees, and collateral on loan approvals.  It is possible that newer 
firms can overcome their relative disadvantage in borrowing by developing and sustaining 
banking relationships over time or by offering collateral or personal guarantees.  To test this 
hypothesis, two additional logistic regression models were developed: 
 
Model 6: 
LOC=a + b1New + b2Logsales +b3Growth +b4ROE + b5Org + b6Judge + b7Delinqp + 
b8Delinqb + b9Bankrupt +b10CredCard + b11TradeCred + b12Relation + b13Guar +  
b14Collat + e  
 
and 
 
Model 7: 
Mrlget=a + b1New + b2Logsales +b3Growth +b4ROE + b5Org + b6Judge + b7Delinqp + 
b8Delinqb + b9Bankrupt +b10CredCard + b11TradeCred + b12Relation + b13Mrlguar +  
b14Mrlcollat + e  
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 The dependent variable LOC is a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the firm 
had a line of credit.  Similarly, Mrlget is a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the 
firm was approved for its most recent loan.  Results reported in Tables 4 and 5 indicated that new 
firms were significantly less likely to have lines of credit, a very flexible credit tool, and also, 
that they were significantly less likely to have been approved for their most recent loan.   
 Several additional independent variables have been added to these models. Relation 
refers to the length of the most important banking relationship in number of months.  In theory a 
longer banking relationships should create a “relationship of trust” and thus increase the 
likelihood of loan approvals.  The variables Guar and Collat are dichotomous variables 
indicating whether or not the firm provided either personal guarantees or collateral for its lines of 
credit.  Correspondingly, the variables Mrlguar and Mrlcoll indicate whether or not the firm 
provided personal guarantees or collateral for its most recent loan.  Both guarantees and 
collateral reduce the risk of the loan to the lender, and should therefore increase willingness to 
lend. 
 The results of these two additional models are provided in Table 7.  Table 7 reveals that 
younger firms (New) were still significantly less likely to have lines of credit (LOC) and that 
they were also significantly less likely to be approved for their most recent loan (Mrlget).  Thus, 
in this analysis, neither length of banking relationship nor guarantees and collateral were 
sufficient to overcome the disadvantage of being a newer firm.     
 Table 7 also indicates that larger firms (Logsales) and less profitable firms (ROE) were 
more likely to have lines of credit.  As noted earlier, larger firms are more likely to require 
additional sources of external capital, while less profitable firms are less likely to be able to self 
finance with retained earnings.  Firms organized as corporations (Org) were less likely to have 
lines of credit.  It is possible that sole proprietorships and partnerships tend to be firms that do 
not have a lot of fixed assets.  Thus, they may be less likely to have loans secured by specific 
collateral and more likely to have lines of credit which are not tied to specific collateral.  In this 
model, firms that use credit cards to finance their businesses (CredCard) and firms that use trade 
credit (TradeCred) were both more likely to have lines of credit.   
 In the expanded Mrlget model, firms that had declared bankruptcy (Bankrupt) were 
significantly less likely to have been approved for their most recent loan indicating that lenders 
are concerned with credit quality and the likelihood of repayment for the loan.  Firms that used 
credit cards for business purposes (CredCard) were also less likely to have been approved, 
possibly because lenders may be concerned with high credit card balances.  In this model, firms 
with longer banking relationships (Relation) were significantly more likely to have been 
approved for their most recent loan suggesting that familiarity with a lender increases the 
likelihood of loan approval.  Since the variable New was still significant and negative in this 
model, however, the beneficial effects of a longer relationship were not sufficient to overcome 
the problem of the liability of newness. 
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V. Summary and Conclusions 
 It appears from these results that new firms do suffer from a “liability of newness” in 
their attempts to secure debt capital.  These findings indicate that new firms are significantly less 
likely to have lines of credit.  This is a particular problem for small firms because a line of credit 
is a very flexible type of loan that can be used for a variety of business purposes.  Further, 
although new firms were significantly more likely to have applied for a loan within the previous 
three years, they were significantly more likely to be turned down.  Finally, new firms were 
significantly less likely to apply for a loan at all, because they assumed they would be turned 
down.  All of this suggests capital constraints for newer firms that are not present for more 
mature firms. 
 The “liability of newness” literature suggests that problems associated with the liability 
of newness can be overcome by developing “relationships of trust”.  Within the context of a 
lender/borrower relationship, this could be done by cultivating a relationship with the lender over 
time or by providing personal guarantees or collateral that will reduce the lender’s risk.  These 
results indicate that those measures do not solve the problem for newer firms.  When we control 
for length of relationship, personal guarantees, and collateral, younger firms were still 
significantly less likely to have lines of credit and significantly more likely to be turned down for 
their most recent loan. 
 These results suggest that providers of debt capital are highly risk averse, and that they 
associate newness with a greater risk of firm failure and non-payment.  Thus, they are less 
willing to lend to younger firms until they have been around for a while and have proven their 
staying power.  If this is the case, it has implications for small firm owners as well as for state 
and local governments seeking to promote the growth of small firms.  If providers of debt capital 
are reluctant to lend to new firms, other sources of capital need to be cultivated.   These include 
loan programs that guarantee loans such as the SBA’s 7(a) program as well as alternative lending 
programs.  Under the 7(a) program, loan losses are partially underwritten by the federal 
government. Thus, lenders are more willing to lend to smaller and riskier firms. Similarly, a 
number of alternative lending programs channel funds toward businesses meeting specific 
criteria such as geographic location or the race, ethnicity, and gender of the business owner.  
Many alternative lenders are non-profit organizations and thus do not operate under the same 
profit and stock price constraints that for-profit lenders have to contend with.   
 Alternatively, more effort at the state and local level could be put into developing and 
expanding angel networks.  Business angels are an important source of financing for newer 
firms, yet the “market” for business angels is highly fragmented, and most small firm owners do 
not know how to get in touch with angels who might have an interest in their business or 
industry.   Suffice to say, if small firms are to continue to be an engine for economic growth and 
a source for new jobs, additional measures need to be taken to help firm owners get their 
businesses from the “new” stage to the “mature” stage.  Some of these measures involve 
identifying and developing sources of capital that will sustain new firms through their early 
years.   
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Table I 
Characteristics of Firms included in the 1998 SSBF 
 
 
 
   New    Mature 
Variables  Firms   Firms   t value  Pr>t 
 
N   920   2641 
 
Totassts** 
 Mean  $248,735  $479,069  -4.25  0.0001  
 Median $32,784  $66,000 
 
Totsales** 
 Mean  $551,806  $1,153,372  -3.97  0.0001 
 Median $96,288  $181,132 
 
Growth** 
 Mean  121.92%  32.72%  1.06  0.0001 
 Median 8.06%   3.92% 
 
Totemp** 
 Mean  5.72   9.69   -7.34  0.0001 
 Media  3.00   4.00 
 
Ownage** 
 Mean (years) 44.96   52.13   -19.31  0.0001 
 Media  44.00   52.00 
 
Exp** 
 Mean (years) 10.72   21.09   -26.93  0.0001 
 Median 7.00   20.00 
 
**differences are significant at the .01 level 
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Table II 
Characteristics of Firms included in the 1998 SSBF 
 
 
 
   New   Mature 
Variables  Firms   Firms  Chi-Square Pr>ChiSq 
 
N   920   2641   
 
Org   42.86
1 
  45.80  2.5188  0.1125 
 
Ed   55.96   53.20  2.1897  0.1389 
 
Serv   43.47   43.23  0.0175  0.8946 
 
Manuf   8.78   8.17  0.3604  0.5483 
 
Transp*  5.26   3.12  9.0512  0.0026 
 
InsRe*   5.10   6.92  3.9611  0.0466 
 
Retail*   28.54   25.14  4.3106  0.0379 
 
ConsMin**  8.59   13.16  14.1721 0.0002 
 
HighRisk**  38.10   25.37  56.0142 0.0001 
 
Judge   4.04   3.73  0.0918  0.6307 
 
Delinqp  12.52   12.31  0.0197  0.8612 
 
Delinqb**  11.00   14.42  -0.3098 0.0074 
 
Bankrupt  3.13   2.22  0.2256  0.1170 
   
Credcard  66.84   68.51  -0.0762 0.3379 
 
Tradecred**  54.81   64.64  -0.4103 0.0001 
    
Denytrade**  7.18   4.67  0.4556  0.0031 
 
1
values are percentage of the total 
*differences are significant at the .05 level 
**differences are significant at the .01 level 
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Table III 
Borrowing Experience of Firms included in the 1998 SSBF 
 
 
 
   New   Mature 
Variables  Firms   Firms  Chi-Square Pr>ChiSq 
 
N   920   2641   
 
Haveloan**  50.35
1 
  56.88  12.3870 0.0004 
 
LOC**  19.83   30.79  42.5203 0.0001 
 
Mrlapp *  25.74   22.39  4.5124  0.0337 
 
Mrlget**  63.84   74.79  11.9882 0.0005 
  
Mrlden y**  36.16   25.21  11.9882 0.0005 
 
Noapply**  30.73   20.42  42.1626 0.0001 
 
1
values are percentages of the total 
*differences significant at the .05 level 
**differences significant at the .01 level 
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Table IV 
Results of Logistic Regression Analyses 
(Values reported are Parameter Estimates 
 
 
 
Variable   Haveloan   LOC 
 
Intercept   -4.1086**   -6.0864** 
New    0.0471    -0.3015** 
Logsales   0.3201**   0.3763** 
Growth   -0.0053   -0.0018 
ROE    -0.0562   -0.2433* 
Org    0.0909    0.1318 
Judge    -0.0601   0.1797 
Delinqp   0.2811*   -0.3365* 
Delinqb   0.4200**   0.3424** 
Bankrupt   -0.2799   -1.4720** 
CredCard   0.4423**   0.5544** 
TradeCred   0.3442**   0.4141** 
DenyTrade   0.2839    0.2017 
 
*results significant at the .05 level 
**results significant at the .01 level 
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Table V 
Results of Logistic Regression Analyses 
(Values reported are Parameter Estimates 
 
 
 
Variable  Mrlapp  Mrlget   Noapply 
 
Intercept  -4.0971**  0.4981   -1.4881** 
New   0.3842**  -0.3851*  0.5880** 
Logsales  0.1999**  0.0301   -0.0593** 
Growth  0.0087   0.0007   0.0009 
ROE   -0.1659  0.5283**  0.1266 
Org   -0.0473  0.3655*  0.0592 
Judge   0.4589*  -1.0466**  0.5380** 
Delinqp  0.4043**  -0.8306**  1.4027** 
Delinqb  0.5122**  -1.0075**  0.9881** 
Bankrupt  -0.1234  -4.2431**  1.9076** 
CredCard  0.3492**  0.2060   0.1601 
TradeCred  0.1125   0.3129   0.0335 
DenyTrade  0.5109**  -0.7652**  1.2557** 
 
*results significant at the .05 level 
**results significant at the .01 level 
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Table VI 
Prevalence of Personal Guarantees and Collateral in Small Firms 
 
 
 
Variable  New  Mature  Chi-Square  Pr>ChiSq  
    
 
Persguar  58.44% 61.12% 0.6206   0.4308 
 
Collat   40.41% 45.04% 1.7957   0.1801 
 
Mrlguar  49.38% 55.01% 2.0729   0.1499 
 
Mrlcoll  53.94% 58.69% 1.5005   0.2206 
 
 
       t value   Pr>t 
        
Relation (months) 48.48  114.63  -17.08   0.0001    
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Table VII 
Results of Logistic Regression Analyses 
(Values Reported are Parameter Estimates) 
 
 
 
Variable   LOC    Mrlget 
 
Intercept   -4.9456**   3.4984** 
New    -0.3707*   -0.5884* 
Logsales   0.1959**   -0.0683 
Growth   0.0018    0.0060 
ROE    -0.4797**   0.5439 
Org    -0.3747*   0.3117 
Judge    0.0053    0.2686 
Delinqp   -0.1767   -0.4855 
Delinqb   0.3530    -0.8230* 
Bankrupt   -2.2783   -3.6097** 
CredCard   0.5239**   -0.7160* 
TradeCred   0.5589**   0.4445 
DenyTrade   -0.1181   -0.9251 
Relation   0.0008    0.0004* 
Guar    20.3262   -0.1056 
Collat    20.8759   -0.1731 
 
*results significant at the.05 level 
**results significant at the .01 level 
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Appendix A 
Definition of Variables 
 
 
 
New:  Dichotomous variable representing firm age.  Firms that had been in existence for 5 or 
fewer years were coded as a “1”.  Firms that were older than 5 years (Mature firms) were coded 
as a “0”. 
 
Totassts:  Total assets for 1998. 
 
Totsales:  Total sales for 1998. 
 
Growth:  Total sales for 1998 minus total sales for 1997, divided by total sales for 1997.  The 
growth rate was set at 0 for firms having a negative growth rate. 
 
Totemp:  Total full-time equivalent employees. 
 
ROE: Return on equity.  Net income for 1998 divided by total equity for 1998.  The return on 
equity was set at 0 for firms having a negative net income. 
 
Ownage:  Age of the firm owner in years. 
 
Exp: Owner’s years of business experience. 
 
Org:  Organizational form.  Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm was organized as a 
limited liability corporation or partnership, or if it was an S-corporation or a C-corporation. 
 
Ed:  Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm owner had attended college. 
 
Serv:  Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm was in a service industry. 
 
Manuf:  Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm was a manufacturer. 
 
Transp: Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm was in transportation. 
 
InsRE:  Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm was in insurance or real estate. 
 
Retail:  Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm was in retail or wholesale trade. 
 
ConsMin:  Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm was in construction or mining. 
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HighRisk:  Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm was rated as having “significant 
risk” or “high risk” by Dun & Bradstreet. 
 
Judge:  Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm owner had a judgment rendered against 
him/her within the past 3 years. 
 
Delinqp:  Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the principal owner was delinquent on personal 
obligations within the past 3 years. 
 
Delinqb:  Dichotomous variable coded as a “1’ if the firm was delinquent on business obligations 
within the past 2 years. 
 
Bankrupt:  Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm or its principal owner declared 
bankruptcy within the last 7 years. 
 
Credcard:  Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm uses personal or business credit cards 
to finance the business. 
 
Tradecred:  Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm uses trade credit as a source of 
financing. 
 
Denytrade:  Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm has been turned down for trade 
credit. 
 
Haveloan:  Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm had one of the six types of loans 
tracked by the SSBF (line of credit, financial lease, commercial mortgage, equipment loan, 
vehicle loan, or other loan). 
 
Mrlapp:  Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm applied for a loan within the previous 3 
years. 
 
Mrlget:  Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the loan applied for was approved. 
 
Mrldeny:  Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the loan applied for was denied. 
 
Noapply:  Dichotomous variable coded as a “1” if the firm did not apply for a loan within the 
previous 3 years because the owner assumed the loan would be denied. 
 
Firmage:  Continuous variable; age of the firm in years. 
 
Relation:  Continuous variable; length of the relationship with the firm’s primary financial 
service provider in months. 
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Guar:  Dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the firm provided personal guarantees for 
its lines of credit. 
 
Collat:  Dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the firm provided collateral for its lines 
of credit. 
 
Mrlguar: Dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the firm owner provided personal 
guarantees for its most recent loan. 
 
Mrlcollat: Dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the firm provided collateral for its 
most recent loan. 
 
